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MUST GOD CREATE?
Sandra L. Menssen and Thomas D. Sullivan

In this paper we evaluate two sets of theistic arguments against the traditional position that Cod created with absolute freedom. The first set features several variations of Leibniz's basic proof that Cod must create the
best possible world. The arguments in the second set base the claim that
Cod must create on the Platonic or Dionysian principle that goodness is
essentially self-diffusive. We argue that neither the Leibnizian nor the
Dionysian arguments are successful.

God "does whatever he pleases in heaven, on earth, in the waters and all
the depths," the Psalter proclaims.] God is "the One who guides all
things as he decides by his own will," and "by his own choice he gave
birth to us," Ephesians tells us. 2 Scriptural teaching concerning God's
absolute freedom in creation was upheld by Augustine and many of the
Church Fathers, and elaborated by Aquinas and other Doctors of the
Church, who argued that not only revelation but reason as well displays
the truth concerning God's freedom: the infinite and self-sufficient
divine nature entails absolute divine freedom. In the nineteenth century
Vatican I recognized the Church's constant teaching concerning God's
free creation as defined dogma: it is an article of faith for Catholics that
God created "by a volition free of all necessity."3
In this paper we evaluate two sets of theistic arguments against the
traditional position that God created with absolute freedom. The first
set features several variations of Leibniz's basic proof that God must create the best possible world. The arguments in the second set base the
claim that God must create on the Platonic or Dionysian principle that
goodness is essentially self-diffusive. In the course of our discussion of
these two sets of arguments we will comment on recent work by Philip
Quinn, Robert Adams, and Norman Kretzmann.
(I)

We begin with a simple Leibnizian line of reasoning that gives us a theistic objection to the position that God created with absolute freedom. Our
aim in discussing the line of reasoning is not to overview or engage the vast
secondary literature it has spawned, but rather to set up what we think is a
new criticism, which will emerge as we discuss variations of the argument.
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(L)

1.

So,

2.
3.

If there is a best possible world, then God must actualize" or create it.
There is a best possible world.
God must create the best possible world.

We call this a "theistic" objection to the position that God created with
absolute freedom since Leibniz was a theist, a compatibilist who held
that God's creation was both free and necessitated, though not absolutely free, not free from every necessity. More often than not, however,
those who approve Leibniz's claim that God must create the best scorn
his rosy view of our own world, and use his "optimistic" arguments 5 to
help build a case for atheism.
Recent literature on whether God must create the best has been critical of the second premise in argument (L).6 Why even think that the
concept "best possible world" is coherent? Why not suppose that there
must be an infinite series of better and better worlds, or infinitely many
worlds in the set of best possible worlds? Leibniz did have arguments
in support of the second premise of (L), arguments which brings us face
to face with his view of our own world. Leibniz held it is possible there is
a best world because the actual world is in fact the best world. It was not
close inspection of our world that led him to his assessment, but rather
reasoning such as this: 7
(L*)

1.
2.

3.

So,

4.

God chose to create this world over all other possible worlds.
It is irrational to choose x over y unless one judges x to be
better than y.
God cannot act irrationally (either because no one can act
irrationally, or because a perfectly good agent cannot act
irrationally).
This world is better than all other possible worlds.

Another, similar argument'
(L**)

1.
2.

So,

3.

God chose to create this world over all other possible worlds.
Choice implies moral preference: no one can choose x over
y without judging x to be better than y.
This world is better than all other possible worlds.

Each of these arguments has serious difficulties. To begin with, of
course, the contradictory of the conclusion of the arguments is likely to
seem far more plausible than some of the arguments' premises. Further,
although Leibniz could have appealed to the principle that "every truth
has an explanation" to support premises (2) and (3) in (L *), and premise
(2) in (L**), we would not want to make such an appeal, for this principle
of sufficient reason - as Leibniz conceived of it, anyway - has the unfortunate consequence that everything that happens, happens necessarily.9
Further still, two sorts of choices made by human beings seem to provide counterexamples to the premise that choice implies moral prefer-
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ence. In the first place, human beings appear to make incontinent choices. Leibniz denied that anyone could act incontinently. Though consciousness of our own weak wills leads us to reject Leibniz's general
claim here, we certainly acknowledge that God is not weak-willed.
Whether the point is argued with reference to God's goodness, or
power, or knowledge, incontinence seems incompatible with divinity.
So the general premise that choice implies moral preference can simply
be reformulated to circumvent the first counterexample. But there is a
second, more damaging counterexample: human beings often appear to
make choices among alternatives equally attractive. Leibniz denied that
such choices are made; he held that there are "minute perceptions" of
which we're not fully cognizant that always determine our selections.
But empirical evidence supporting his judgment is lacking. (Perhaps a
Leibnizian would suggest that even if humans can make choices among
equally attractive alternatives, God can't do so. But an argument would
be needed to support the suggestion and it's not evident how the argument would go.) Finally, it might be objected that premise (2) of (L**)
wrongly assumes that moral goodness is not the only kind of goodness.
Leibniz clearly thinks that all choices are ultimately moral choices,l° but
the position needs a defense.
It seems at the very least problematical, then, to accept Leibniz's contention that the coherence of the concept of the best possible world can
be seen to follow on an argument that our world is the best."
We want to offer a variation of Leibniz's basic argument - a variation
of (L) - which does not assume the coherence of the concept "best possible world." Our argument is a variation in a rather loose sense: it does
not yield the conclusion that God must create the best possible world, but
it does yield the conclusion that God must create. This variation is consistent both with the hypothesis that there is an infinite series of increasingly
better possible worlds, and with the hypothesis that there are infinitely
many worlds in the set of best possible worlds.
Our argument requires constructing two sets of possible worlds
(where a "possible world" is a "total possible state of affairs," and,
hence, one of the possible worlds is the state of affairs that consists of
God's existence alone, without any creation). The first set of possible
worlds we'll define - call it W - includes (a) the possible state of
affairs (or possible world) consisting of God's existence alone, without
any created or actualized material or immaterial world, and (b) the possible worlds consisting of God's existence plus the existence of a created
or actualized world that is not good. W has within it, we presume, infinitely many possible total states of affairs. The second set of possible
worlds - call it W* - also includes infinitely many possible total states
of affairs: those consisting of God's existence plus the existence of an
actualized material or immaterial world that is good.
(5)

1.
2.

There is at least one world in W*.
If there is at least one world in the set of possible worlds
W*, then God must create a material world (must actualize
one of the possible worlds in W*) [because)

Faith and Philosophy

324

a.

So,

3.

Some possible worlds in W* are better than all possible worlds in W.
b. Where there are possible worlds of type x that are
better than possible worlds of type y, God's act of
creating a type-x world is better than his act of creating a type-y world.
c. If one action is better than another, then God cannot
choose the less perfect action over the more perfect
action. 12
God must create a world in W*.

Assuming (as we are) that God exists, the existence of the actual
world strongly suggests that premise (1) is true.
What of premise (2)? If it is true, then the traditional position concerning God's absolute freedom in creation is false. We consider here
several ways of arguing against the second premise, one of which we
will endorse.
Perhaps the standard Thomistic line of attack against premise (2)
involves refutation of (2-a). It is often said that one can't add to the infinite, and since God is infinite there is no greater value in a W* world
than in the state of affairs that consists of God alone. But as Aquinas
noted, one can make additions to the infinite if one goes into a different
order of infinity.13
Moreover, this "standard" Thomistic approach - which may not
have been Aquinas's approach - makes the divine creative action out to
be nugatory, and we don't think that it is nugatory. It is not a main purpose of ours to offer a full-fledged defense of premise (2-a). We think
the conclusion of (5) is false, and our main concern will be to attack a
later premise of argument (5). However, we do want to indicate how a
case for (2-a) might be built, because we think that in fact this premise
can be defended. And if it can be, that means our attack on a later
premise of (5) will have added significance for the defender of the traditional position that God does not create necessarily.
A complete defense of (2-a) requires an account of grading worlds. 14
The intriguing and multi-faceted question of how (or even whether)
worlds can be graded in goodness received Aquinas's careful attention
and has of late interested diverse commentators on Aquinas. ls Among
the issues the question raises are these: What is a world? Are there different kinds of worlds? Is the criterion of goodness for a thing determined by its kind's function? Does the world have a function? Can
states of affairs within the world be graded in goodness? How do assessments of the goodness of parts of the world contribute to our assessment
of the whole? If some thing x is a good x, is it necessary that x be a good
for some conscious being? Might some possible worlds be incommensurable in value?
But it is not necessary to settle all of these matters before beginning to
construct a defense of (2-a).16 A defense of (2-a) will emphasize the fact
that the premise does not claim that all possible worlds are commensurable in value, or that there are ordinal rankings of possible worlds. It
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suffices that at least one possible world in W* is better than the worlds in
W. Knowledge that being has value in and of itself may be knowledge
enough to support (2-a). Knowledge that a particular possible world in
W* is good for some of the individuals it contains together with the
belief that the possible world is not necessarily bad for any of the individuals it contains may be enough to support (2-a), even if we do not
know exactly how goods for individuals contribute to goods for worlds
(presumably, great goods for many individuals will not detract from the
overall value of a world, at least not enough to make the value the world
adds to God's existence a negative value).
In sum, the intuition we have - an intuition many will share - that
premise (2-a) is correct may well admit of rigorous support.
What of premise (2b)?'7 If one were to argue against it one presumably would target its counterpart, which avoids talk of types of worlds:
Where possible world x is better than possible world y, God's
act of creating x will be better than his act of creating y.
It might be said (against the counterpart claim) that one can't consider
actions abstractly, that any judgment about an action is a judgment
about the action in certain circumstances: studying mathematics, for
instance, is the right thing to do now, in these circumstances. But we do
speak as though some actions are better than others, abstractly: doing
high-level math is better than doing low-level math, abstractly considered, though one may have obligations to children or students that make
it better in a particular circumstance to do the less exalted work. If x is
better than y, abstractly, than creating x is better than creating y,
abstractly. And then if nothing stands in the way in the circumstances,
it's preferable actually to create X. 18
It might also be suggested that the counterpart claim is false because
though objects of acts always contribute to the goodness of acts, differences in the goodness of objects don't always or necessarily affect the
goodness of the associated acts. It has been suggested to US '9 that:

II[Plerhaps having an object of goodness 1-4 gives an act 2
'object goodness points,' having an object of goodness 5-8 gives
an act 4 'object goodness points,' and the differences between 1
and 4 and between 5 and 8 are not relevant to act goodness. Is it
really better to create a beach with a million grains of sand than
to create a beach with 999,999? Why? More seriously, perhaps
creating a universe with some rational agents is better than creating a universe with none, but the number of rational agents
isn't really relevant."
But if one weakens in this way the connection between the goodness of
the object and the goodness of the act, it is not clear why we should say
that there is any connection at all. Further, the particular cases mentioned present some perplexities. Given the homogeneous set-up (virtually identical grains of sand, e.g.), it's very strange that there would be
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thresholds (between 4 and 5, for instance) where for no discernible reason it becomes valuable to add a grain of sand. If adding a grain of sand
changed the order of the whole, it would make more sense to speak of an
increase in value - but the role order plays in judging the value of a creative act has dropped out in the example given. So maybe it's not better
to create a beach with a million grains of sand than a beach with 999,999
(or a world with a million rational persons instead of 999,999). In fact,
it's not clear that the bigger beach is abstractly speaking better than the
smaller one anyway - it may not be if, for instance, we must always ask
"better for whom?" when we claim x is better than y.
Or, it might be suggested that Robert Adams has provided counterexamples to what we've called "the counterpart claim" (the claim that
where possible world x is better than possible world y, God's act of creating x will be better than his act of creating y). Richard Swinburne, for
instance, writes: "Anyway, even if there could be a best of all possible
worlds, it seems highly dubious to suppose that God is under any moral
obligation to create such a world. This has been well argued in an
important article by Robert Merrihew Adams .... "21 We think, however,
and will argue briefly here, that Adams has not provided counterexamples to the counterpart claim.
If God is obliged to create the best possible world, Adams holds,2' it is
because by not doing so either he wrongs someone, or he is less kind
than he should be, or he manifests a defect in character (such as envv).
But, Adams says, God doesn't wrong anyone or fail to act kindly
towards anyone if he creates a world less good than the best possible
world. And he doesn't manifest a defect in character, because he instead
exhibits a virtue: God exhibits the virtue of grace in choosing "to create
and love less excellent creatures than He could have chosen." He could
have made a better world had he chosen to create better creatures,
Adams says, but it is not wrong to create beings less excellent than others one could have created, and in choosing this world, with us in it,
God acts graciously. Adams says that two sorts of cases show it's not
wrong or even less than ideal to create beings less excellent than other
beings one could have created: cases in which human beings who are
breeding animals breed less than the best - goldfish, for instance, rather
than golden retrievers; and cases in which humans choose to have normal children rather than super-children they could conceive through
taking a certain drug.
We agree with Adams that it is not wrong or less than ideal for
human beings to breed goldfish instead of golden retrievers, and that it
is not wrong or less than ideal for human beings to refrain from taking a
drug that would produce super-children. In considering Adams's examples, however, one needs to ask: why aren't these things wrong? One
needs to ask this question because one needs to know whether the reasons that apply in the case of human beings also apply in the divine
case. We suggest here that they do not.
In the case where one imagines someone choosing to breed goldfish,
one presumably imagines the work as part of an overall life rich in various ways, where the breeding project may be connected to other impor-

MUST GOD CREATE?

327

tant projects; for instance, conducting scientific research, or supporting a
family in one's own particular circumstances, that is, with the talents and
resources one has. But now imagine the project of breeding new strains
of weeds, not because one's interested in agriculture or in improving the
world's food supply, not because one has the research interests of the
botanist, but simply as a way of taking up time. Imagine the project not
of breeding new strains of weeds, but simply of growing weeds, growing, or bringing into existence, as many weeds as is possible. Is this an
admirable project? What about counting the weeds or the blades of grass
in your front yard?" The fact is that some projects are better than others.
And it seems plausible that some creative projects are better than others,
abstractly speaking.
Why isn't it wrong for prospective parents to refuse a drug that will
produce super-children? Adams doesn't say. It would be reasonable to
think that because taking the drug involves using unnatural measures to
achieve one's purposes, one needn't - or shouldn't - take the drug.
And perhaps the purposes are relevant, too: if the aim is to produce
super-human, non-human beings, then the aim is off-limits. But God is
not constrained by what is "natural" in the same way that human beings
are; it is difficult to see what baseline could be used in making judgments about what's natural for God.
So the interesting examples Adams develops do not suggest that (S) is
vulnerable to attack at (2-b).
Are there other ways to argue for the counterpart claim (the claim
that where possible world x is better than possible world y, God's act of
creating x will be better than his act of creating y)? Arguments to support the counterpart claim might be found in Aquinas's texts. His general theory of norms for actions measures acts by their objects and ends.
It would seem that God's actions would be measurable in the same way.
Furthermore, in discussing the incarnation Aquinas indicates that it may
be more fitting for God to do one thing rather than another; and one
might argue that a thing can't be more fitting unless it's better. On the
other hand, Aquinas sometimes writes as if the general norms are not
applicable in any straightforward way in God's case.
However this is to be worked out within the context of Aquinas's
thought, the least that can be said is that it's not easy to see how it's supposed to turn out that one of God's actions isn't better than another
given that the states of affairs they produce differ in value.
The problem with (2), we suggest, is not with (2b), but with (2c), that
is, with the claim that if one action is better than another, then God cannot choose the less perfect action over the more perfect action. Suppose
there is no best possible world. Then God must choose a state of affairs
less good than another he could have chosen, whatever he does (this is
assuming that creating nothing is choosing a state of affairs). But if one
accepts this, why would one stipulate that the action he chooses to perform must be better than one of the (good) choices he could have made,
which consists of not creating any material world? It seems completely
arbitrary to require that God create a material world, to hold that God's
creation is necessary, but to allow that he might create less than the best
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possible world, that he might perform some creative act less good than
another he was capable of performing. (In Section II of this paper we
consider whether appeal to a "diffusiveness of goodness" principle
might provide a non-arbitrary ground for the requirement that God
must create, though he may create a world less good than another he
might have created. We argue that such an appeal does not provide a
non-arbitrary ground for the requirement.)
Recognizing this problem with (2c) allows us to formulate another
objection to (L), and also to Leibniz's arguments (L*) and (L **) purporting to establish that our world is the best possible world. Furthermore,
it allows us to respond to the following Leibnizian argument:
(L ***) 1.

2.
3.
4.

So,

5.

God chose to create this world.
God can't choose a less perfect action over a more perfect
action.
So when God created the world, there was no action open
to him better than the action of creating this world.
Where possible world x is better than possible world y, God's
act of creating x will be better than his act of creating y.
There is no possible world God could have created better
than this world.

Given the fact that the conclusion of (L ***) is so unpalatable (no more
palatable than the claim that our world is the best possible world), it is
useful to have a rejoinder to (L ***). But (L ***) is not susceptible to the
criticisms we earlier raised against (L *) and (L**).
We can, however, reject (L ***) as well as (L), (L *), and (L **) by rejecting premise (2c), the premise that "God can't choose a less perfect action
over a more perfect action." As we've just noted, this contention can be
true only under the arbitrary stipulation that some good choices open to
God aren't good enough for him to adopt, while other good choices are
good enough to adopt, even though there would be better choices.
Neither (L) nor (5), then, compels us to overturn the traditional position that God's creation is absolutely free. 24
Our reasoning here suggests that if there were a best possible world,
then God would have to create it; or if there were a set of best possible
worlc. . .;, ~od would have to pick one from the set. As theists, we infer
there is no best possible world, and no set of best possible worlds. Perhaps
for any world one picks, there is a better. But there are alternative positions, and given our citation (in footnote 11) of Leibniz's attack on the
notion of an infinite series of increasingly better worlds, the alternatives
are important to notice. If (some) possible worlds are incommensurable in
value, or if possible worlds cannot be graded at all, we also have reason
for thinking that God need not create the best possible world.
Philip Quinn has recently presented a Leibnizian argument suggesting
that God must create the best possible world. We close Section I of this
paper with an evaluation of his argument. The argument has a problem,
we suggest, similar to the problem we identified in argument (5).
Quinn's argument is offered as a response to the case Robert Adams
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has made for the claim that God needn't create the best possible world,
even assuming there is such a thing. (We discussed Adams's case above
as we considered how premise (2b) of argument S might be attacked.)
Quinn's response to Adams's line of reasoning considers the defensibility
of several variations on the Leibnizian dictum that God must create the
best possible world. The variation Quinn endorses is: 25
"If an omnipotent and superlatively good moral agent were to
actualize a possible world, he would actualize some actualizable
world of unsurpassable moral goodness."

This conditional is supported, Quinn says, by the following principle,
which we call "Q":2b
(Q) "Necessarily, for all w, w', and x, if w is an actualizable
world and w' is an actualizable world and w is a morally
better world than w', then if x is an omnipotent moral agent
and x actualizes w', then x is such that there is some possible world in which there is a y such that y is a better moral
agent in that world than he is in w'."
What are we to make of Quinn's argument, and in particular of the
crucial premise (Q)? In the first place, we note that Quinn offers virtually no defense of (Q). He has two things to say on its behalf. One is that
it seems to him that (Q) "expresses a fairly obvious truth."?7 It does not
seem obvious to us. Quinn also notes that (Q) does not fall prey to certain of Adams's counterexamples to the principle that "it is wrong to
bring into existence, knowingly, a being less excellent than one could
have brought into existence."2H But assuming this is true, it does not constitute an argument for (Q).
Why does Quinn think (Q) expresses a fairly obvious truth? How
might one argue in favor of (Q)? (Q) appears to us to rest on an assumption we have criticized, the assumption that if one action is better than
another, then God, a perfectly good moral agent, cannot choose the less
perfect action over the more perfect action. (This assumption is premise
(2-c) in argument S above.) At least, Quinn's principle could be supported by an appeal to the assumption. Quinn does not explicitly appeal to
this assumption or to any other ground for his principle. We think that
some ground for the principle needs to be found if the principle is to be
supported, but since our aim is not to support the principle, we do not
explore this issue in detail. The fact that (Q) may rest on the questionable assumption is perhaps obscured in Quinn's discussion by his claim
that if an agent does not do the best he can, morally speaking, then it is
possible that there is another agent morally better than the first agent.
But this claim is true only if a perfectly good moral agent cannot choose
the less perfect action over the more perfect action. And that is to say,
this claim is false.
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(II)

We now turn to a second set of arguments against the traditional position that God's creation is absolutely free. These arguments rely on the
Platonic or Dionysian principle that goodness is essentially self-diffusive.
We speak in the plural here of "arguments," but we do not lay each one
out. That's because the multiplicity of the arguments is a consequence of
the multiplicity of interpretations of the diffusiveness principle. We will
set out some of these multiple interpretations; with them in hand the
anti-traditionalist may construct his arguments.
(DP) Goodness is necessarily diffusive of itself.
Such is one standard formulation of the diffusiveness principle. What
does the principle mean?
Plato's role in establishing the principle has been seminal, so we
might begin by asking what help he can give us in interpreting it. The
early pages of the Timaclls provide frequently cited and influentiaF9 support for the diffusiveness principle. Plato's cosmogony presents two
reasons for thinking that the divine craftsman must create the best possible world. One reason is that a failure to do so would exhibit the vice of
jealousy; a second reason is that a good craftsman always makes any
work as good as it can be. Perhaps the reason a craftsman always produces the best work possible is that a failure to do so reflects envy; or
perhaps the two reasons are independent. At any rate, the argument
that a craftsman must create the best work possible suggests the following principle that might be used to argue that God must create the best
possible world: If, when one creates an x, one ought to create a good x,
then one ought, prima facie, to make that x as good as it can be. This
principle, however, doesn't seem to be a specification of the diffusiveness principle. In fact, it seems more to resemble some of the principles
we worked with in section (1).
The Timaeus is not the only work of Plato's that contributed to the formation of the diffusiveness principle. The metaphor of light Plato used
repeatedly and to powerful effect in describing the Form of the Good
played a role in making the diffusiveness principle attractive, for
instance, and certainly influenced Plotinus's view of the inevitability of
creation. But it's unlikely reflecting on this metaphor of light is the
quickest route to interpreting (DP). One of the many problems we'd
encounter in our reflections is the fact that (DP) must be interpreted as
applying to moral agents if the principle is to ground an argument that
God must create.
The short answer to the question, "how much help can Plato give us
in interpreting the diffusiveness principle?" is: for our purposes, not
much. Should we, then, turn to Plotinus or Pseudo-Dionysius? Should
we look at Aquinas?
The diffusiveness principle is what we might call a "deep maxim."
Philosophical principles or maxims may sometimes have the form of
"deep maxims" or "deep sayings": these are philosophical maxims that
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are not precisely expressed, but which concern deep matters. For
instance, "meaning is use" and "truth is correspondence to reality" are
deep maxims (compare them with Quine's more sharply formulated
point: "to be is to be the value of a bound variable"). Meditation on deep
maxims yields further results. Thus Tarski, meditating on Aristotle (who
doesn't exactly use the language of "correspondence," but something like
it), offers a refinement of Aristotle. Or, consider the deep maxim "do not
do evil in order that good may come." In some sense this principle seems
right. But a wide range of questions must be answered before an interpretation is specified; philosophical work must be done.
What we need to do to understand whether (DP) mandates God's creation is specify precisely its various possible interpretations. What we will
try to do with the diffusiveness principle is in a way what Aquinas did in
discussing the principles his predecessors used. Perhaps the point is worth
emphasizing here, because one of the problems some critics have had with
Aquinas's interpretation of the diffusiveness principle is that Aquinas interprets it in a way that seems to be at variance with his predecessors. 3u We
don't deny that Aquinas may well take principles in a way at variance with
his predecessors, but we think one reason he does is that there are problems
with the predecessors' interpretations. Aquinas often takes maxims, sometimes maxims so obscure that they verge on the mystical, and works with
them to draw out their most defensible senses. For instance, he considers
the scriptural claim that the name of God is "I am"; though the exact meaning of this saying is nearly impenetrable, Aquinas articulates an understanding of the claim that gives the lofty, literary expression philosophical
sense. He is committed to preserving the truth of "goodness is diffusive of
itself" without preserving past interpretations.
So let us likewise try mapping out interpretations of (DP) without becoming mired in historical exegesis. There are many dimensions of variability
we can build into our interpretations - among the questions that arise are:
Does the being (we assume there is a being, an agent) diffuse its very own
goodness? Does it create? Does it merely endow with goodness? Is the
being merely disposed to endow? Does the being create/ endow /have a disposition to endow all? Does the being create/ endow /have a disposition to
endow goodness in a maximal degree? Does the being exercise final rather
than efficient causality in diffusing goodness?
We offer a beginning sketch of some possible interpretations of (DP). All
of the interpretations we've included here construe the diffusiveness principle as requiring efficient causation, because if one is going to try to pull a
mandate for creation out of the principle, it seems the principle must be
taken as referring to efficient causation.
(DPl)

Necessarily, a being is good if and only if it brings it about that
[every possible thing exists and shares its very goodnessl or
[something exists and shares its very goodnessl or
[whatever already exists shares its very goodnessl.
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Necessarily, a being is good iff for any x, if it's possible for x
to exist, then the being brings it about that x exists and has
[to a maximal degree a similar property of goodness] or
[to some degree a similar property of goodnessl.

(DP3)

Necessarily, a being is good iff it brings it about that whatever already exists shares its very goodness.

(DP4)

Necessarily, a being is good iff for any x that already exists,
the being
brings it about that
[x maximally imitates it] or
[x imitates it to some degreel.

(DPS)

Necessarily, a being is good iff it is possible for that being to
bring it about that
[every possible thing exists] or [some thing exists]
and is endowed with [a maximal degree of] or [some] typewise goodness,
or
[all] or [some] already-existing entities distinct from itself
are endowed with [a maximal degree of] or [some] type-wise
goodness.

(DP6)

Necessarily, a thing is good iff it is disposed to bring it about that
[everything] or [something] have a property similar to its own
goodness.

First, a general comment about these interpretations. As we have
spelled the interpretations out, they have within them divergent paths
- bracketed options offer sub-choices. And there are additional paths
we haven't indicated among the bracketed options. For instance, someone opting for the first clause under (DPl) would have to give some
coherent account of what "every possible thing" means. Are we talking
here about the largest compossible set of existents? What sorts of entities count as "things"? Only objects of creation that are in some sense
immediate (in God's case, perhaps, possible worlds that can be "actualized")? Are possible natural kinds the relevant sorts of "things" - are
they among the relevant sorts of things? What about poems? What
about individual members of natural kinds, or individual poems?
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Similar questions can be raised about the other interpretations of (DPl).
Since we are not defending a particular interpretation of (DP), we are
not especially concerned with tracing out all the possible interpretive
paths. The variants we have identified will be sufficient to suggest that
it would be hard to find a plausible interpretation that yields the mandate to create, and that one who holds that Dionysian considerations do
require God to create is obligated to produce an argument based on a
specific interpretation of the Dionysian principle.
Let's consider the plausibility of the various specifications.
(DP1) When a river overflows its banks it diffuses its verv water over
wider ground. But at least outside the trinity, things don't lite~ally come to
share God's goodness, any more than they share his being. Rather, an entity comes to share properties which are similar to, causally linked with,
God's properties. So (DPl) is not acceptable. This point may seem trivial,
but we make it because Norman Kretzmann, whose work we will soon discuss, maintains that one shouldn't read the diffusiveness principle as concerned with final causality since under such a reading goodness is not really
communicated. We think any sensible interpretation of the principle will be
one in which goodness is not "really" communicated in the strong sense in
which river water is "communicated" to the banks. Perhaps there is something weaker than this that could reasonably be called "real communication" that is involved in efficient but not final causality - but we think the
burden of specifying such an interpretation falls on the person who endorses the interpretation.
Another problem with (DPl) is that it seemingly allows nothing but
God to be good. The same problem affects most - probably all - of the
other interpretations of (DP) we've offered. For our present purposes it
can be solved simply by revising the principles so that they state necessary
and sufficient conditions for an agent being perfectly or unsurpassedly or
maximally good. Though this would solve the problem for our present
purposes, it would also strip the diffusiveness principle of its broad scope,
and that might in other contexts be problematical. Perhaps one could say
that a DP-type principle holds for a perfectly good being as a consequence
of a more general diffusiveness principle that governs the goodness of all
moral agents. There of course would be lots of work involved in specifying and defending this more general diffusiveness principle.
(DP2) If we go with the first bracketed clause under (DP2), we get the
objectionable consequence that there is a best possible world. If we go
with the second clause, we've made the completely arbitrary (and hence
objectionable) stipulation that God must create every possible thing, but
needn't endow each thing with the greatest possible quantity of goodness. If he needn't endow with the greatest possible goodness, why
can't he be satisfied with the good state of affairs which consists only of
his own existence?
(DP3 - DP6) These interpretations of the diffusiveness principle don't
entail that a creation is necessary.
We have so far discussed no plausible interpretation of (DP) that mandates creation.
Now our list of possible interpretations of (DP) involving efficient
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causality certainly omits some readings, but if one of the omitted possible readings is deemed important, the interpretation must be specified
and the importance argued. The burden of proof here is surely on the
one who claims that (OP) entails the necessity of creation.
Kretzmann is among those who have claimed that (OP) requires God
to create. Although Kretzmann does not undertake the project of explicitly defending or even specifying any particular interpretation of the diffusiveness principle, he does give an account of creation which, if plausible, would help specify an interpretation of (OP). Furthermore, his
account, if plausible, might be of special interest to those attracted to
theism who think our world is not the best possible world, since
Kretzmann thinks one can block the move from "God must create" to
"God must create the best possible world./I So we will spend some time
here examining Kretzmann's understanding of creation.
Kretzmann does not explicitly list or identify the key theses or
assumptions of his account. We identify the following suppositions as
important elements in the account: 31
(K)

0) God must diffuse his goodness by freely creating a world

that represents him maximally but not excrescently.
There is an upper limit to what creaturely minds can appreciate.
(3) Our world is not the best possible world.
(2)

Some of the terminology in the first supposition requires explanation.
Kretzmann says that if our world represents God maximally, then "the actual world considered as a representation of God is as good as possible in the
sense that any world better than this one in terms of improved precision of
representation would be no better at all in its capacity to represent God to
any possible created percipient./l32 Kretzmann does not use the phrase
"excrescent creation"; we introduce it as shorthand for the idea that the
world contains a greater degree of representation than it's possible for any
creature to understand.
We want to suggest that the first and second of these suppositions are
doubtful in their own right, and that further, when the third is added an
inconsistent set may be generated.
Though (1) points towards a specification of the diffusiveness principle, the specification is implausible. It tells us that since the rationality
of God's choice is pegged to the world's representative features, God has
no reason for including any unappreciated features in the world. 33 A
tree that falls in the forest makes no sound unless there's someone
around to hear it; indeed; there are no trees in the forest unless the forest
is explored - maybe constantly. Our views of the world are views of a
big Hollywood set, appearances without substance.
A person defending the first supposition in (K) might say that this notion
that the universe is hollow, is a facade, assumes that the trees in the forest
play no causal role in the universe. But this would be a weak defense, for
surely God can do as he likes without secondary causes. Or, a defender
might say that if God were to make a hollow universe then God would be a
deceiver. But where's the deceit? We can deduce that the world is a shell of
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accidents, given Kretzmann's account of creation.
The first supposition in (K) seems implausible for a second reason: it
appears to stipulate arbitrarily that, given a choice between a world with
one maximally appreciative creaturely intelligence plus a handful of far
less appreciative creatures, and a world with vast multitudes of almostmaximally appreciative creaturely intelligences, God must pick the first
world. (This requirement holds given Kretzmann's understanding of
"maximal representation"; as we indicated above, Kretzmann takes a
world to represent God maximally only if there is no world that better
represents God to any possible created percipient.)
There's a third reason supposition (1) is implausible. If possible world
alpha represents God's goodness as well as and no better than beta, then,
assuming the conditions in (1) are met by both alpha and beta, God may
choose between them. Indeed, God must have an option of this sort if his
selection is free, Kretzmann says. But that means that either the selection of
alpha over beta serves no purpose of God's, or it serves a purpose unconnected to the diffusion of goodness. If picking alpha over beta serves no purpose of God's, but God simply prefers alpha, then why can't God pick one of
the worlds that contains an excrescence of goodness simply because he
prefers it? If choosing alpha over beta serves a purpose unconnected to the
diffusion of goodness, why can't God use considerations other than those
involving the diffusion of goodness in choosing which world to create?"
Consider the second presupposition in (K): "There is an upper limit
to what creaturely minds can appreciate." This too seems doubtful. It
may be that what we can learn from direct encounter with the world is
limited. But why couldn't we appreciate the same kind of thing over
and over, for instance through endless exploration of the stars? There is
a kind of infinitude intrinsic to the human mind: there is nothing about
which we can't understand something. Even truths we are incapable of
discovering through empirical investigation or reason may partially be
grasped or appreciated by the human mind - God could, if he liked,
whisper to us various secrets about the trinity, for instance. And he
could inform us that certain things exist which we can't directly appreciate. In these cases it would seem that there is not the sort of upper limit
Kretzmann imagines. There is not a limit such that we can't imagine a
better world whose increased value we could appreciate in some way.
Furthermore, (2) is ambiguous, and on all of the possible readings that
suggest themselves it is problematical. Call the upper limit mentioned in (2)
UL. On one reading - call it (a) - UL is the lowest limit none of the creatures can attain. On another reading, (b), UL is such that some creatures can
attain it, though no creature can go beyond it. Assume (a) is the correct
understanding of (2). Then our world represents God's goodness excrescently, because no creature can appreciate it. But this is inconsistent with
(1). And if our world does represent God's goodness excrescently, why
couldn't he have created some other world with an even greater excrescence of goodness? Assume (b) is the correct reading. It then follows that
God actually has created the highest form of creaturely intelligence and
placed it in an unimprovable position to know or appreciate the world.
This is highly implausible. In fact, it follows that, contrary to (3), God has
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indeed created the best possible world. For how could there be a better
world? If there were a better world, it seems either it would have to be better for someone, or better simpliciter. But who could it be better for? Not
God, and not the creatures that can't appreciate it. And if it is claimed to be
better simpliciter, then in the first place one needs to give an account of what
the claim means (how can something be "better," but not "better for something or someone"?). And in the second place, one needs to explain why
God couldn't say: I choose to create this world over that world because simpliciter, this world is better.
One might think that some modifications in Kretzmann's account of
creation would substantially strengthen it. There are two modifications
which, we think, might seem attractive. The first involves saying that it
is possible for God to create excrescently, so long as such a creation is
necessary to obtain the best possible representation of God to creaturely
intelligences. The second, more radical modification involves claiming
that there's no reason to stipulate that it's necessary that God does not
create excrescently, but only to stipulate that it's not necessary that God
create excrescently.
But neither of these modifications would save Kretzmann's account,
for there is yet a further ambiguity involved in specifying UL. We suggested above that there are two readings of UL, which we labeled (a)
and (b). The modifications in (K) we've just offered would remove the
problems we identified as attached to reading (a). But now consider a
further interpretive question, which can be raised under both (a) and (b).
Must God create the best possible world that we can fully understand as
a manifestation of God's goodness? If so, then it looks like he can't create any world, because since we can't completely understand God's
goodness, it would seem we couldn't fully understand any world as a
manifestation of his goodness. Is it instead the case, then, that God must
create the best possible world that can be appreciated in some degree? If
so, then God can make the best possible world, and simply inform us of
the fact that he has done so. Our intellects have a universality that
would make it possible to appreciate such a fact. But (3) tells us our
world is not the best possible. So once again, we find an inconsistency
in the set of propositions in (K).3'
We conclude from all this that Kretzmann's account of creation is unpersuasive and that it cannot readily be modified to withstand objections.
Kretzmann's attempt to block the move from "God must create" to "God
must create the best possible world" fails; and his account does not point
towards a plausible specification of (DP).
It might be suggested that even though we haven't found a defensible
interpretation of (DP) that mandates creation, there is good reason to try
to formulate such an interpretation, since many people have an intuitive
sense that goodness has to be shared, that generosity must be a component of perfect goodness. Kretzmann has, in fact, suggested that we
have this intuitive sense; he thinks the Dionysian principle "expresses an
important truth about goodness."36
We want to close with a few remarks on the intuition that goodness
has to be shared.
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Traditional theism has certainly acknowledged that goodness has to
be shared. God's goodness is shared among the three persons of the trinity, it has been maintained. But Kretzmann thinks this sharing doesn't go
far enough. Why not? For one thing, he says, self-diffusiveness must be
a property of the triune God, and not just of each of the three persons,
and "the essential self-diffusiveness of goodness as an aspect of the
essence of the triune God" calls for "extrinsic, volitional diffusion, or creation."3? Granted that the triune God is good, we don't think enough is
understood about the trinity to say that the triune God can't diffuse his
very own goodness through the love exchanged by the Father, Son, and
Holy Spirit.
Kretzmann also says we have an intuitive understanding of what it
means to say "God is love" which requires that God create a material
world. Kretzmann criticizes Peter Geach's defense of the claim that
"God is love because, and only because, the Three Persons eternally love
each other"38 by claiming that "Geach transforms 'God is love,' the transcendent comfort of Christians for 2,000 years, into a Dear-John letter
from the triune God to everyone of those unsuspecting loving creatures."39 Now when we say "God is love" we may very well have in
mind his love for us; God did, after all, create a material world, we are in
the world, and Love has entered the world. But this doesn't mean that
God would not be love if God had not created. From eternity and for
eternity, God is love. And the fact that God would still be love even if
he had not created does not mean that he does not love us (presumably,
Kretzmann is suggesting that given Geach's understanding of love, God
doesn't love us - a Dear-John letter Ineans the sender doesn't love the
recipient).
If Geach's statement that "God is love because, and only because, the
Three Persons eternally love each other" is taken to mean that God
would be love even if he created things and didn't love them, then the
statement is false, we think. But we see no reason to think Geach would
recommend such an interpretation. Rather, we think Geach is saying
that God is love; he creates things and loves them, but it is not in virtue
of this that he is love.
The traditional theistic view that the persons of the trinity exchange
love, that they share goodness and exhibit generosity is, we believe, correct. Our intuitive sense that goodness involves sharing requires no
more than this. And, as we have said, we think that one who claims that
a diffusiveness principle (or an intuition about sharing) entails the
necessity of creation should specify a plausible interpretation of the
principle and show that the interpretation has the entailment.
In sum, we are aware of no plausible interpretation of the diffusiveness principle requiring God to create, and see no good reason for thinking one can be constructed. The Dionysian arguments that God must
create are no more successful than the Leibnizian arguments.
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